Richard Pettigrew grew up in Edinburgh. Between 1999 and 2003, he read Mathematics and Philosophy at University of Oxford. After that, he moved to Bristol, reading for an MA in Philosophy (2003-4) and then a PhD in Mathematical Logic (2004-8). From 2008 until 2011, he was a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at University of Bristol; in 2011, he was appointed to a Lectureship there. In 2012, he was appointed to a Readership and, in 2014, he became Professor of Philosophy. Between 2014-5, he acted as Head of Department.

Richard’s research has moved from the proof theory of set theory and bounded arithmetic through the philosophy of mathematics and modal logic to formal epistemology and the foundations of statistics and, most recently, into decision theory. Over the past four years, his research has been funded by an ERC Starting Researcher grant, Epistemic Utility Theory: Foundations and Applications, which has allowed him to study how we might motivate and justify certain principles of rational probabilistic reasoning by considering the extent to which our probabilistic beliefs get close to the truth. In his future work, he hopes to focus on the decision theory of major like decisions, such as becoming a parent, choosing a career, or choosing to undergo risky medical treatment.

Richard has published academic articles in Philosophical Review, Noûs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophy of Science, Review of Symbolic Logic, and Philosophers’ Imprint, amongst other journals. His first book, Accuracy and the Laws of Credence, is due to be published by Oxford University Press in April 2016.

Richard serves on the committee of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science and the committee of the Analysis Trust. He is a member of the editorial board for Ergo, Philosophia Mathematica, and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.